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How Deposit Insurance  Whether  the adoption  of
explicit  deposit  insurance
Affects Financial Depth  strengthens financial markets
or  weakens  them  depends  on
the circumstances  in which  it
(A Cross-Country Analysis)  is  adopted.  Adopting  it to
counteract  instability  appears
Robert Cuill  to have  little (or negative)
effect. Adopting  it when
government  credibility  and
institutional  development  are
high  appears  to  have  a
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Summary findings
Should we expect deposit-  insurance to have a positive  which mnay  decrease the likelihood of bank runs and
effect on development of the financial sector? All  increase financial depth. Indeed, simple bivariate
insurance pools individual risks: premiums are paid into  correlations between explicit insurance and financial
a fund from which losses are met. In most circumstances,  depth are positive. But when one also controls for
a residual claimant to the fund (typically a private  income and inflation, that relationship disappears  -in
insurance company) loses money when losses exceed  fact, the partial correlation between changes in
premiums. Claimants that underprice risk tend to go  subsequent financial depth and the adoption  of explicit
bankrupt.  insurance is negative (and quite pronounced).
With most deposit insurance, however, the residual  Counterintuitive though it may be, that stylized fact
claimant is a government agency with very different  may be partially explained by the political and economic
incentives. If the premiurns paid by member banks  factors that motivated the decision to establish an
cannot cover current fund expenditures, the taxpayer  explicit scheme. The circumstances surrounding
makes up the shortfall. Facing little threat of insolvency,  decisions about deposit insurance are associated with
there is less incentive for administrative agencies to price  different movements in subsequent financial depth.
risk accurately.  Adopting explicit deposit insurance to counteract
In the United States, researchers have found that the  instability in the financial sector does not appear to solve
combination of increasing competition in banking  the problem. The typical reaction to that type of decision
services and underpriced deposit insurance led to riskier  has been negative, at least with regard to financial depth
banking portfolios without commensurate increases in  in the three years after the program's inception.
bank capital. Deposit insurance may facilitate risk-taking,  Adopting explicit deposit insurance when government
with negative consequences for the health of the financial  credibility and institutional development were high
system.  appears to have had a positive effect on financial depth.
Oni  the positive side, insurance may give depositors
increased confidence in the formal financial sector -
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Should we really expect deposit insurance to have a positive effect on financial
sector development? All insurance pools individual risks -- premiums are paid into a fund
from which losses are met.  In most circumstances, there is a residual claimant to the fund
(typically a private insurance company) that loses money when losses exceed premia.
Those claimants that underprice risk tend to go bankrupt.  With most deposit insurance,
however, the residual claimant is replaced by a government agency with very different
incentives. If the premia paid by member banks cannot cover current fund expenditures, it
is the taxpayer rather tlmn the government agency that makes up the shortfall. Facing
little threat of fund insolvency, there is less incentive for administrative  agencies to price
risk accurately.
Deposit insurance funds that underprice risk provide managers of banks with an
incentive to hold excessively  risky portfolios.  Because deposit insurance lowers the price(interest rate) that banks must pay to attract deposits, the banks that profit most are not
well-capitalized ones that manage risks prudently -- they could attract deposits at low
prices with or without insurance.  It is, rather, poorly capitalized banks with portfolios
comprised of very risky assets that profit most from the ability to attract cheap deposits.
Although there has been a recent move to establish risk-based capital guidelines (  the
Basle Agreements), in many cases prudent banks and risky banks pay the same premium
rate on their deposits.  In such systems, the incentive to become a risky bank is probably
strong.
In the U.S. case, the combination of increasing competition in banking services and
underpriced deposit insurance appears to have led to riskier banking portfolios without
commensurate increases in bank capital. Keeley (1990) finds evidence that, as
competition in banking increased, franchise values of banks declined. 2 Barth, Brumbaugh,
and Litan (1990) point out that many of the largest banks in the U.S. had capital to assets
ratios between 3-5% in the late 80s and early 90s, a far cry from the 8% ratio for insured
commercial banks in the 1960s. While capital was declining, bank portfolios became
increasingly  focused on real estate lending, mortgage-backed securities, and standby
letters of credit, all relatively risky activities (Hetzel (1993)).
The stylized facts for the U.S. suggest that deposit insurance may have helped
facilitate greater risk taking, which may have had negative implications for the overall
2  One source  of that competition  came  from a commercial  paper market  that attracted  many of the
banks' largest corporate  clients.
2health of the financial system.  Akerloff and Romer (1993) helped formalize the
connection between deposit insurance, low capital ratios, and excessive risk taking; and in
a  recent cross-country analysis, Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1997) found a
pronounced positive partial correlation between explicit deposit insurance and systemic
bank insolvencies. As Caprio and Klingebiel  (1996) point out, over the last twenty years
systemic bank insolvencies have become increasingly  common; in many cases, bail-out
costs ranged from 10-50% of GDP.  Politicians that ignore incentives in the banking
sector appear to do so at their peril.  Stylized facts, theoretical predictions, and empirical
work strongly suggest that incentives resulting from deposit insurance have had a negative
effect on financial sector development.  To the extent that financial development affects
economic growth, and a growing body of empirical evidence strongly suggests that it
does, the link between deposit insurance and financial development may be an important
one. 3
Given the incentive problems, why would governments create deposit insurance
programs?  In short, insurance provides assurances to savers which may spur de-
personalized capital mobilization and thus be a source of financial sector stability  and
growth.  Diamond and Dybvig (1983), for example, emphasize the self-fulfilling  nature of
bank panics. Explicit deposit insurance may eliminate  that possibility, which may in turn
have a beneficial effect on financial depth.  The main focus of this paper is to determine
3  Authors have  long emphasized  the connection  between  a well-functioning  financial  sector  and
economic  performance  (e.g. Schumpeter  (1912)). Goldsmith  (1969) and McKinnon  (1973)  offered
important  early cross-country  analyses  of financial  development  and growth. More  recently,  King
and Levine  (1993)  have shown  that the level of financial  intermediation  is a good predictor  of long-
run rates  of economic  growth,  capital accumulation,  and productivity  improvements.  For a complete
summary  of the empirical  literature  on the links between  financial  institutions  and economic  growth,
see Levine  (1997).
3whether explicit deposit insurance programs have actually contributed to financial sector
development.  I find that, since 1980, countries that established explicit schemes
experienced post-inception increases in financial depth that were, on average, slightly
larger than the typical increases for countries that retained implicit insurance.  However,
when one controls for other relevant factors that affect financial depth (including inflation
and real per capita income), explicit programs were associated with less financial  depth
than implicit ones.
I also study the context surrounding the adoption of explicit insurance.  Although
we may conclude that, on average, deposit insurance has not been positively associated
with financial sector development, there may have been instances when it was beneficial.
For example, the programs may have been a success when governments confronted the
incentive problems discussed above through improved supervision and prudential
regulation of banks. Both Calomiris (1992) and Kane and Hendershott (1996) find links
between the effectiveness  of monitoring and supervision and the solvency of deposit
insurance schemes.
More generally, the credibility of an explicit scheme as viewed by depositors may
be an important determinant of subsequent movements in financial  depth.  Depositors
likely respond favorably to government actions that alleviate uncertainty.  In Argentina's
1989 financial  crisis, for example, Baer and Klingebiel  (1995) point out that, although the
government took actions that imposed costs on time deposit holders, the deposit to
4currency ratio rebounded shortly thereafter. Credible actions that alleviate uncertainty
appear to foster increased financial depth, even in the midst or the immediate  wake of a
financial crisis.
I find that explicit deposit insurance programs were positively correlated with
subsequent increases in financial depth if they were adopted when proxies for institutional
development and government credibility were high. Governments have been more likely
to adopt an explicit scheme when volatility in the banking sector 4 was low and when
neighboring countries were also doing so.  To a lesser extent, they have also been more
likely to adopt insurance in the aftermath of a systemic bank crisis and in countries with
strong legal systems. The largest declines in financial depth have occurred when explicit
insurance was adopted while financial sector volatility was high. However, after
controlling for the interaction between explicit insurance and financial  instability, explicit
insurance was positivelycorrelated  with subsequent changes in financial depth.  These
results indicate a link between the circumstances surrounding the adoption of an explicit
program and financial depth.  In contrast to adopting deposit insurance in an unstable
period,  adoption due to strong legal traditions or as a post-crisis intervention (factors
more closely associated with credibly assuring depositors), appears to have a positive
effect on financial depth.
4  Volatility  is measured  as either the standard deviation  or the coefficient  of variation in M2/GDP.
5II.  Deposit Insurance and Financial Depth:  Correlations
At the simplest level, it appears that those countries that adopted explicit deposit
insurance from 1980-95 enjoyed slightly higher growth in financial  depth than those that
did not (Table 1). In the three years after the inception of an explicit program, the average
increase in the ratio of M2 to GDP (M2/GDP) was 2.6%.  For quasi-money to GDP
(QM/GDP), the average increase was 1.9%. The average three-year changes in M2/GDP
and QM/GDP for those countries that retained implicit schemes from 1980-95 were both
1.8%. The higher M2/GDP figures for countries with explicit programs do appear to be
influenced by a handful of observations.  The median three-year increase on that measure
for b6th "explicit" and "implicit" countries was 0.8%.  However, for QMIGDP, perhaps a
purer indicator of financial development because it does not include MI, the median
change was 1.8% for explicit countries and 0.9% for implicit ones.
Table 1: Post-Deposit Insurance Changes in Financial Depth 1980-1995
Average Change in M2/GDP  Average Change in
Statistic  Quasi-Money/GDP (Three Years After Explicit Deposit  (Three Years After Explicit Deposit
Insurance Enacted)  Insurance Enacted)
i_________________  Explicit5  Implicit
6 Explicit  Implicit
Mean  +2.6%  +1.8%  +1.9%  +1.8%
Median  +0.8%  +0.8%  +1.8%  +0.9%
Standard  Dev.  9.6%  2.6%  4.1%  2.0%
Minimum  -8.7%  -2.5%  -7.1%  -0.8%
Maximum  +32.1%  +9.4%  +8.7%  +6.4
Observations  15  29  1  5  31
5  Includes  only  those countries  that adopted  explicit  insurance  from 1980-95. More  pronounced
differences  between  implicit  and explicit  countries  are evident when  those countries  that adopted
explicit  insurance  prior to 1980  are included  in the calculations.
6  For those countries  that maintained  implicit  deposit  insurance  (the control  category),  changes in
financial  depth were first calculated  over  all possible  three year periods  from 1980-95;  those three-
year figures  where then averaged.
6Of course, the slight disparities in growth in financial depth highlighted  in Table I
may be driven by factors other than explicit deposit insurance. For example, countries that
adopted explicit schemes tended to have much higher real per capita income than those
that did not (Table 2).7 Given the strong link between income and financial depth
emphasized  by other authors (Gertler and Rose (1994), for example), one would expect
that, in countries with higher income, financial depth would be greater, with or without
explicit deposit insurance. It is, however, unclear why the change in financial depth
should necessarily be greater for countries with higher real per capita income. 8 Countries
that adopted explicit programs also had slightly lower inflation than those that did not,
which also may have spurred greater growth in financial depth independent of deposit
insurance. Similarly,  because large fiscal deficits are often associated with financial
disintermediation,  larger deficits for implicit countries may also have had a dampening
effect on financial depth unrelated to explicit insurance.
With respect to banking sector stability, explicit countries had much lower
coefficients of variation for M2/GDP, which may indicate that it was prior stability (rather
than the adoption of explicit insurance) that was largely responsible for the relatively large
increases in financial depth.  In short, the data in Table 2 make it clear that isolating the
effect of explicit deposit insurance on future financial  depth is difficult, and that the
7  Among  the  explicit  countries  in Table  2, I include  countries  that  adopted  deposit  insurance  prior  to
1980.  These  countries  are  also  included  in the  regressions  that  follow.
8  It is true  that  countries  that  have  high  real  income  also  tend  to have  well  developed  financial
infrastructure  (Levine  (1997)).  Perhaps  those  countries  with  better  infrastructure  are in a better
position  to capitalize  on the  benefits  of deposit  insurance.  We  might,  therefore,  expect  subsequent
changes  in financial  depth  to be positively  correlated  with  real  per capita  income.
7relatively large increases in depth for countries with explicit schemes should, perhaps, be
attributed to a host of other factors.  Section III offers a more formal attempt to
disentangle the relationship between the circumstances surrounding deposit insurance
decisions and their eventual impact on financial depth.
Table 2: Characteristics  of Countries  with  Explicit  and Implicit  Deposit  Insurance  Programs
Variable  Explicit Progra  s  I  plicit Progra  s
Mean  St Dev  Obs  Mean  St Dev  Obs
PerCap Inc*  7268  4406  131  4042  4377  45
Inflation  14.3%  16.8%  33  19.0%  20.4%  31
3yr Deficits  3.0%  3.4%  32  3.9%  4.6%  39
M2 Instabil*  6.9%  6.3%  35  15.3%  9.5%  23
Law Index*  3.92  1.79  43  2.74  1.31  43
Bank Crisis  25.8%  31  14.3%  56
Notes: Per capita  income measured  in 1985  $US. For explicit  countries,  income  and inflation  figures  are
for the year of the program's adoption,  deficits and M2 stability  are for the three years prior to adoption,
and bank crises  are for the five years prior to adoption. For implicit countries.  income,  inflation,  deficit,
and M2 stability  are averaged  over all years  for which data were available. Bank crisis data are for the
five  years leading  up to the last decision  to retain an implicit  program  (i.e., 1990-94).  For both implicit
and explicit  countries,  the ICRG  Law  Index (a six-point  scale  with higher values indicating  a stronger
legal tradition)  is averaged  over 1985-91. M2 instability  is the coefficient  of variation in M2/GDP
(standard  deviation/mean).  Bank crisis is a dummy  variable  equal to one if a bank crisis occurred.
* Means  for explicit  and implicit  are different  from one another  at the t = 0.05 level. (results  similar  when
variance  for each sample  assumed  equal or unequal).
Cross-country  regressions  for the level of financial depth  in 1992 indicate  that the
positive link between explicit deposit insurance and financial development suggested by
the summary  statistics in Table I is closely associated with income levels. Controlling for
income and the average level of inflation from 1990-92, the partial correlation between
explicit  deposit  insurance  and financial depth  is actually negative.9 The estimated
coefficients  for the explicit  deposit  insurance  variable  imply large reductions  in financial
9  Similar  qualitative  results  apply when  deficits  as a percentage  of GDP are included  in the regression
and when  the coefficient  of variation in M2/GDP  replaces  inflation  as a measure  of instability. The
instability  measures  enter the regressions  with the expected  negative  sign, but they never approach
conventionally  accepted  levels  of significance,  perhaps  because  they are averaged  over  a relatively
brief  time period  (1990-92).
8depth -- for M2/GDP the reduction is roughly 10%; for QM/GDP, 8%. However, the t-
statistics for these coefficients are significant at only at the .10-.  16 levels.  10
Table 3:  Explicit Deposit Insurance and Level of Financial  Depth, 1992
Explanatory  Dep Var:  M2/GDP  Dep Var: Quasi-Money/GDP
Variable
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Constant  0.275  0.283  0.156  0.158
(7.06)  (7.02)  (4.52)  (4.40)
Per Capita Inc  0.043  0.043  0.034  0.034
(6.51)  (6.48)  (5.91)  (5.84)
Explicit Dep Ins  -0.097  -0.104  -0.080  -0.082
(1.53)  (1.62)  (1.42)  (1.43)
Avg Inflation  (90-  -.004  -.001
92)  (0.83)  (0.27)
Adj.  R-Squared  .49  .47  .44  .44
Observations  51  51  51  51
Notes: t-statistics  in parentheses.  Per  Capita  Income  measured  in thousands  of 1985  $US.  Inflation
measured  as average  annual  percentage  change  in consumer  price  index.
Regression analysis of short-term financial deepening provides a somewhat
stronger indication that explicit deposit insurance is negatively associated with financial
development.  Controlling again for inflation and income (both changes and levels), the
dummy variable for explicit deposit insurance is negatively and significantly  associated
with changes in M2/GDP and QM/GDP (Table 4).  The estimated coefficients indicate
that, holding other factors constant, countries with explicit deposit insurance experienced
2-3% less growth in M2/GDP and QM/GDP in the three years after the program's
inception than did the typical country that retained implicit insurance. The overall fit of
the change in financial depth regressions is good -- income level enters positively and
10  Though  weak,  the  result  is somewhat  reminiscent  of  the  Denirguc-Kunt  and Detragiache  (1997)
finding  that  explicit  insurance  is positivelv  correlated  with  systemic  banking  crisis.
9significantly;"  income  changes  also enter  positively,  though  insignificantly;  and,  inflation
enters  negatively  and significantly.  On the basis  of the regression  results in Tables  3 and 4,
one would  conclude  that explicit  deposit  insurance  has typically been nlegatively  correlated
with financial development.  The next  section analyzes  the decision  to create  an explicit
program  in order to  explain this negative  partial correlation.
Table  4: Explicit  Deposit Insurance  and  Changes  in Financial  Depth
Explanatory  Dep Var: Change  in the Ratio  of M2  Dep Var: Change  in the Ratio  of
Variable  to GDP  Quasi-Money  to GDP
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Constant  2.268  1.800  2.259  2.137
(3.15)  (2.01)  (3.27)  (2.48)
Per Capita  Inc  0.247  0.276  0.199  0.245
(2.29)  (2.21)  (1.93)  (2.04)
Explicit  Dep Ins  -2.980  -2.867  -1.581  -1.738
(3.58)  (2.85)  (1.98)  (1.80)
Avg Inflation  -0.084  -0.080  -0.065  -0.065
(5.71)  (4.70)  (4.60)  (3.99)
% Change,  Real  0.276  0.134
Per Capita  GDP  (1.39)  (0.91)
Adj. R-Squared  .52  .46  .37  .34
Observations  43  40  43  40
Notes: t-statistics  in parentheses. Per Capita  Income  measured  in thousands  of 1985  $US  (Source:
Summers-Heston).  Inflation  measured  as average  3-year  percentage  change  in consumer  price index. For
countries  with explicit  programs,  inflation  wvas  averaged  over the three-year  period  just after inception.
For those  with implicit insurance,  inflation  was averaged over all 3-year  periods  from 1980-95  for which
data were available. Countries  with inflation  rates higher than 80% were  excluded  from these
calculations.
III.  The  Decision  to Create  an Explicit  Deposit  Insurance  Scheme
From  a methodological  perspective,  isolating  the link between  explicit  deposit
insurance  and financial depth  is difficult because  the decision  to  create an explicit  scheme
likely depends  on many factors  that also drive future  financial depth.  Accounting  for the
This is little surprise  given  the summary  statistics  in Table 2. Again, however,  the theoretical  link
between  income levels  and changes  in financial  depth is not well established.
10co-determination between institutional or policy variables like deposit insurance and
economic outcomes is, of course, a common problem. Here the decision to adopt explicit
insurance (an institutional choice) is modeled as a function of economic and institutional
outcomes up to that point.  The decision components (explanatory variables) from this
reduced form are correlated with future financial depth in different ways, indicating that
the circumstances surrounding a program's  adoption may exert a powerful influence on
subsequent outcomes in the financial sector.  The issue of causation cannot be completely
laid to rest, however -- as noted, past economic outcomes may dictate both the deposit
insurance choice and future outcomes in the financial sector.  In this sense, the deposit
insurance choice may not be causing the financial sector outcomes.  At the least, however,
the strategy enables one to (1) isolate the links between particular past economic and
institutional outcomes and the deposit insurance decision, and (2) estimate the
independent association between some of these decision factors and subsequent financial
market reactions.  In turn, one can readily interpret the partial correlations as providing
support for the idea that the factors underlying the deposit insurance choice do, in some
sense, shape or cause the future reactions.
Among the past economic outcomes that may influence decisions to adopt deposit
insurance are past volatility in the financial sector including past systemic banking crises.
Among the institutional factors that may affect these decisions are a country's legal
traditions and the influence of its neighbors or of international lending institutions such as
11the IMF and the World Bank.  The link between deposit insurance and each of these
factors is discussed in turn.
Prior Financial Instability
Adopting insurance in a turbulent period may signal an alarm bell for depositors.
Policy makers, therefore, may attempt serious banking reform only in relatively calm
periods.  Also, financial instability is often closely related to inflation. Because few
explicit schemes index coverage for inflation, a program adopted in an inflationary period
may not be a credible form of depositor protection. 2  If such credibility is important to
policy makers, volatility measures such as inflation and the standard deviation of M2/GDP
should be negatively related to the adoption of deposit insurance.
Post-Banking Crisis
In the wake of a severe crisis, an explicit program may be necessary to restore
depositors' faith.  Unlike the pre-crisis instability described above, governments need not
worry about the signal sent by adopting deposit insurance as the crisis has already
occurred.  One would, therefore, expect a positive relationship between past crisis and the
adoption of explicit insurance.
12  Another  hypothesis  is that  variation  in M2/GDP  is a signal  of  the  ease  with  which  depositors  can
exit  a country's  financial  svstem  in case  of impending  problems  (exchange  rate  depreciation,  real
estate  lending  bubbles).  Because  exit  is a form  of self-insurance,  the  need  for explicit  insurance  may
be lower  in countries  that have  active  financial  sectors  as measured  by  variation  in M2/GDP.
12Legal Traditions
As individual income (and thus wealth) grows, the need to protect property rights
likely becomes greater.  Explicit deposit insurance may, therefore, be one example of
improved property rights.1  Another view is that there is little point in adopting deposit
insurance in a country where legal traditions are especially weak.  In those instances,
depositors are unlikely to believe that insurance coverage is meaningful.  Countries that
scored high  on the ICRG index  of legal development  should have been more likely  than
others to adopt deposit insurance.  14
External Pressure
Some countries may be prodded into adopting explicit deposit insurance. For
example. countries that joined (or were attempting to join) the European Union were
required to adopt an explicit program.  Similarly,  countries may be required to adopt
explicit insurance as parrof  the IMF's or the World Bank's loan conditionalities. In
addition, close links between countries may prompt some to mimic  the policy choices of
13  Knack  and Keefer  (1995)  argue the reverse,  however. In their view, because  the income  gains
associated  with  improved  property  rights are so high, it is more likely  that changes in property rights
drive income  rather  than the reverse. Co-determination  between  these  variables  is a difficult
problem.  one that is beyond  the scope  of this paper. Each of these  variables  is used in the models  of
deposit  insurance  choice  that follow.
14  The index was  created  by a private  international  risk service,  the International  Country  Risk Guide.
Here we use  only  the "rule of law" component  of their ratings. This  variable  "reflects  the degree  to
which  the citizens  of a country  are willing to accept the established  institutions  to make  and
implement  laws and adjudicate  disputes." Higher  scores  indicate  "sound  political  institutions,  a
strong  court  system,  and provisions  for an orderly  succession  of power." Lower  scores  indicate  "a
tradition  of depending  on physical  force or illegal  means  to settle claims." Upon changes  in
government  in countries  scoring  low  on this measure,  new leaders  "may  be less  likely  to accept  the
obligations  of the previous  regime." See  Knack and Keefer  (1995)  for additional  description.
13their neighbors. 5  Such pressure is, admittedly, difficult to measure.  Here we employ the
percentage of countries within a region that adopted explicit insurance as a crude proxy
for pressure." 6 One would expect a positive relationship between these "neighbor" effects
and explicit deposit insurance.
The regression analysis that follows controls simultaneously  for banking instability,
and the other aspects of deposit insurance decisions described above to better isolate the
effect of each component on financial depth.  The results in Table 5 indicate that the
probability of adopting explicit insurance increases by 25-30%17  for countries that
experienced systemic banking crises within the preceding five years.  1 8 However, in only
one specification (model 3) does the crisis coefficient achieve significance  at the .10 level.
N  Neighbor  effects  in the U.S. have  been studied  by Case et al. (1989). They  find that a state's level of
per capita  income is affected  by the expenditure  levels  of its neighbors. In specifying  neighborliness
they note  that. "various  measures  of distance  between  neighbors  vield  similar  results,  as long  as the
measures  are powerful  enough  to select  a small  number  of states as a given state's neighbors."  (p.
19). The argue that "copycatting"  is not confined  to subfederal  jurisdictions  but also may  be
practiced  by national governments.
16  In the models  of deposit  insurance  choice  that follow.  the country  in question  (i.e., the one making
the choice) is excluded  from the regional  pressure  calculation.
17  All percentage  change estimates  were calculated  at the means  of the explanatory  variables  in Table
5.
18  The bank crisis dummy  variable  used here comes  from Demirguc-Kunt  and Detragiache  (1997).
They  define  "full-fledged"  crises as those  where at least one of the following  four conditions  held: (1)
the ratio of non-performing  assets  to total assets  in the banking system  exceeded  10%;  (2) the cost of
the rescue  operation  was at least  2% of GDP; (3) the episode  involved  a large scale  nationalization  of
banks;  (4) extensive  bank runs took place  or emergency  measures  such as deposit  freezes,  prolonged
bank holidays,  or generalized  deposit  guarantees  were enacted  by the goverrnent.  To identify  crises
that satisfy  these  criteria they  relied on four recent  studies: Caprio  and Klingebiel  (1996),  Kaminsky
and Rhinehart (1996),  Lindgren  et al. (1996),  and Sheng  (1995). Based  on the crisis  dates reported
in Demirguc-Kunt  and Detragiache  (1997)  and Caprio  and Klingebiel  (1996),  1  constructed  a
dummy  variable  equal to one if a crisis had occurred  during any part of the five years leading  up to
the adoption  of explicit  deposit  insurance. For countries  that retained  implicit  schemes,  the crisis
dummy  equaled  one if a crisis occurred  from 1989-1993. Because  the papers  used  to construct  the
crisis dummy  focus  on 1980-1995,  countries  that adopted  explicit deposit  insurance  prior to 1980  are
dropped  from the regression  analysis in Table 5.
14A somewhat more pronounced relationship is evident between explicit deposit insurance
and banking instability (significant  at the t=.O  1-.  10 level). For a one standard deviation
increase in the coefficient of variation in M2/GDP, the probability of adopting an explicit
scheme declines by 27%.  In other words, as instability  increases, governments have
typically been less willing or able to formalize deposit insurance arrangements.
Banking sector instability, moreover, appears to exert an influence on the deposit
insurance decision independent of income and institutional development. In model 1 of
Table 5, the ICRG index of legal institutional development is included as an explanatory
variable. For every one-point increase on that six-point scale, the estimated coefficient
implies an 8% increase in the probability of adopting explicit deposit insurance. The
relationship between explicit insurance and the ICRG index does not achieve the same
level of significance as that between past financial crisis and explicit insurance. As noted,
however, income levels are highly  correlated with ICRG scores, which may suggest that it
is income rather than institutional development per se that influences the deposit insurance
decision. In model 2 of Table 5, real per capita income replaces the ICRG legal index as
an explanatory variable. The estimated coefficient is positive and significant.19
19  Though  not  displayed  here,  when  the  ICRG  index  and  per capita  income  both  enter  the regression,
their  estimated  coefficients  and t-statistics  are  much  smaller  than  when  they  enter  separately.
15Table 5:  Regression Analysis, Deposit Insurance Decision
Dependent Variable: Dummy =1. if Explicit Deposit Insurance Program
Explanatory  Adopted
Variables  (Probit Estimates)
Probit  dF/dX  Probit  dF/dX  Probit  dF/dX  Probit  dF/dX
(z-  (z-  (z-  (z-
score)  %  score)  %  score)  %  score)  %
change  change  change  change
(1)  (la)  (2)  (2a)  (3)  (3a)  (4)  (4a)
Constant  .128  .117  -.332  -.500
(0.19)  (0.20)  (0.43)  (0.52)
Prior Instability  -.077  -3.04%  -.106  -4.07%  -.061  -2.40%  -.079  -2.93%
(2.29)  (2.52)  (1.76)  (1.68)
Recent Financial  .737  27.9%  .741  28.8%  .821  30.6%  .735  28.2%
Crisis  (1.49)  (1.37)  (1.64)  (1.17)
Legal Tradition  .203  8.06%  .153  6.06%  .009  0.3%
(1.38)  (0.96)  (0.04)
Real GDP Per Capita  .154  5.90%
(1.96)
% Neighbors Adopted  1.30  0.51%
EDI (since 1980)  (1.04)
% Neighbors Adopted  3.07  1.14%
EDI (since 1985)  (1.86)
Obs.  43  40  42  33
Chi-Sqr(3)  13.38  19.48  13.96  12.89
Prb > ChiSq  .0039  .0002  .0074  .0118
Pseudo R2  .225  .357  .240  .291
Notes:  z-scores in parentheses in Columns (1). (2), (3), and (4).  % changes in columns la, 2a, 3a. 4a
computed at the means of the independent variables.  Prior Instability is the coefficient of variation
(standard deviation divided by mean) for M2/GDP over the three years prior to the adoption of explicit
deposit insurance.  For those countries that retained implicit insurance, the coefficient of variation is
calculated over all three-year periods from 1980-95 for which data were available.  Recent Financial
Crisis is a dumnnv  variable = 1, if a systemic financial crisis occurred within the five years prior to the
deposit insurance decision.  For those with implicit deposit insurance, the five year period was 1989-93.
Legal Tradition is a six-point index created by the Intemational Country Risk Guide.  Higher scores
indicate "sound political institutions, a strong court system, and provisions for an orderly succession of
power."  Legal tradition data averaged over 1985-1991. "% Neighbors adopted EDI" is the percentage of
countries within a region that adopted explicit deposit insurance after the date specified (above).  Regional
pressure figures exclude the country in question from the calculation.  The five regions for developing
countries were Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, the Middle East, and Transitional Socialist
Economiies. Developed countries were all grouped into one category (region).
16Finally, regional pressure (contagion) is positively associated with decisions to
adopt explicit deposit insurance, especially recently. Among those countries that had not
yet adopted explicit insurance by 1985, the probability of adoption was positively
associated with the percentage of neighboring countries that adopted insurance from
1985-95 (model 3).  The estimated coefficient implies that the probability  of adopting
explicit deposit insurance would increase by about 30% if the percentage of neighboring
countries that also did so increased by one standard deviation (27%).  Although the proxy
used here is crude, it does appear that there may be "contagion" effects associated with
explicit deposit insurance.
IV. Changes  in Financial  Depth: Regressions
The data suggest that banking stability, systemic crises, institutional development
(especially as it relates to income), and neighbor effects all have influenced deposit
insurance decisions. Though the relationship between explicit insurance and banking
stability is clearly the most pronounced, the partial correlations with the other explanatory
variables in Table 5 are of the expected sign and approach conventionally accepted levels
of significance  in some specifications. In the regressions for changes in financial depth
that follow, the interaction between explicit insurance and instability is included as an
explanatory variable. A negative partial correlation between changes in financial depth
and that interaction term might indicate that timing effects matter -- in particular, adopting
explicit insurance in a turbulent environment may send a bad signal to the banking sector.
The deposit insurance dummy also enters these regressions on its own, which should
17capture the non-stability related components of explicit insurance, and their influence on
financial depth.  In this way, the deposit insurance decision is de-composed to determine
whether its individual aspects had different effects on subsequent changes in financial
depth. The underlying rationale is that financial actors, particularly depositors, may
respond to explicit insurance differently depending on their perceptions of why it was
adopted.
In other specifications  the interaction between explicit insurance and prior financial
sector volatility was replaced with an interaction between explicit insurance and the ICRG
legal index.  This term should help capture the degree to which an explicit scheme is
perceived as credible by depositors.  This test is similar to that for the interaction between
explicit insurance and prior volatility -- both prior volatility and poor legal institutions are
indications that the circumstances surrounding the adoption of explicit insurance are less
than ideal from depositors' perspectives.  One would, therefore, expect both to have a
negative effect on subsequent financial depth. 20
Table 6 summarizes the results. 21 In both the M2/GDP and QM/GDP regressions,
20  One  could  argue  that  financial  instability  is caused  by  poor  legal  institutions,  and thus  the  test  using
the  interaction  between  explicit  insurance  and the  ICRG  legal  index  is more  appropriate.  However,
the  simple  bi-variate  correlation  between  the  ICRG  index  and volatility  (as  measured  by  the
coefficient  of  variation  in M2/GDP)  is only  -.32,  which  suggests  that  only  a fraction  of financial
market  instability  can  be  explained  by  poor  institutions.  Since  the  ICRG  index  and  prior  financial
instability  measures  appear  to capture  similar  but not identical  effects,  results  for  both  interaction
terms  are  discussed  below.
21  The  countries  used  in the  regression  analysis  are  listed  in Appendix  I. They  comprise  a good  mix  of
developed  and  developing  countries.  Bolivia  is excluded  from  the  regression  analysis;  its average  3-
year  rate  of inflation  during  this period  was  1065%.  When  that observation  is included,  estimated
coefficients  change  dramatically  and  the  overall  fit  of the  regressions  declines  substantially.  At  the
18the estimated  coefficients  for inflation and real per  capita  income  are quite  similar to those
in Table 4 -- inflation enters  negatively  and  significantly in all specifications.  Changes  in
real income also enter  positively,  although  that coefficient  is never significant.  The
interaction  term between  explicit  insurance  and banking  sector  instability  enters negatively
and significantly, which  might suggest  that adopting  deposit  insurance  in a turbulent
period  contributes  to reduced  financial depth.2 2 A less causative  interpretation  would  be
that,  in countries  that  adopt  deposit  insurance  to stop or delay a crisis (ie.,  those  with high
financial instability),  the program  has been unsuccessfiul -- financial depth  decreased
anyway.23
outset, 103  countries  were included  in the analysis. Missing  data, however,  limits me to forty-one
countries  (at most) in the regressions  reported  here.
22  As noted,  members  of the European  Union  were required  to adopt explicit  deposit  insurance  (if they
had not already  done so) in the late 1  980s. While  it is difficult  to know for certain  whether  their
motivation  to adopt was membership  in the Union  or was driven  by other factors,  it is plausible  that
depositor  reactions  to an EU-directed  scheme  may  be different  than to other  insurance  programs.
The EU effect  is potentially  important  in three of the cases in this sample  -- Belgium  (adoption
1985),  Denmark  (1988),  and Ireland (1989). However,  the qualitative  results  of the analysis  are
unchanged  when a dummy  variable  is used  for these cases  or when they are dropped  from the
regressions.
23  This  does not mean that adopting  deposit  insurance  in turbulent  periods  is necessarily  a bad idea.
The relevant  counter-factual  analysis  would  estimate  how much further  financial  depth would  have
fallen in the absence  of deposit  insurance. The result should,  however,  give policy  makers  an
indication  that deposit  insurance  is unlikely  to stop or reverse  crisis.
19Table 6: De-Composed Deposit Insurance Choices and Subsequent Changes in Financial Depth
Explan.  Dep Var: Change in Ratio of M2 to  Dep Var: Change in Ratio of Quasi-
Variable  GDP  Monev to GDP
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
Constant  .264  .201  -1.48  .775  .720  -.549
(0.30)  (1.02)  (1.11)  (0.88)  (0.73)  (0.40)
Avg. Inflat.  -.111  -.115  -.093  -.095  -.097  -.081
(6.73)  (6.29)  (5.42)  (5.71)  (5.47)  (4.57)
% Growth  .092  .108  .046  .060
(Real GDP)  (0.69)  (0.79)  (0.34)  (0.42)
Income Per  0.065  0.046
Capita  (0.52)  (0.38)
Explicit  1.98  2.18  3.79  2.04  2.18  3.38
(1.63)  (1.52)  (2.36)  (1.68)  (1.56)  (2.04)
Exp x Volat  -1.42  -1.40  -.576  -.985  -.957  -.369
(3.71)  (3.31)  (3.67)  (2.56)  (2.31)  (2.28)
Volatility]  1.102  1.100  .986  .981
(st dev M2)  (4.33)  (3.68)  (3.85)  (3.38)
V'olatilitv 2  .357  .305
(coef of var)  (3.54)  (2.93)
Adj. R-Sqre  .603  .528  .575  .475  .422  .406
Obs  40  41  40  40  41  40
F  12.83  9.93  11.56  8.05  6.84  6.34
Prob > F  .0000  .0000  .0000  .0000  .0002  .0003
Notes:  t-statistics in parentheses.  Observations for countries with average 3-year inflation higher than
1000% excluded from the analysis.  Avg inflat. and Income Per Capita are described in notes to Table 4.
Explicit is a dummy variable equal to one for countries with explicit deposit insurance.  Volatility I is the
standard deviation of M2/GDP.  For countries with explicit insurance. the standard deviation was
computed over the three years prior to its adoption.  For countries that retained implicit insurance.
standard deviations were computed for all three-year periods from 1980-95: the average of those standard
24
deviations enters these regressions.  Volatilitv 2 is the coefficient of variation in M2/GDP (standard
deviation/mean).  It was computed over the same time intervals as Volatility 1.  % growth (real GDP) is
the average annual growth rate in real GDP.  For implicit countries it was computed over the same time
intervals as the volatility measures.  For explicit countries it was computed over the three years just after a
program's inception.
The dummy variable for  explicit  insurance,  which  should capture  non-stability-
related  circumstances  surrounding  deposit  insurance  decisions  such as past crises,  legal
tradition,  and neighbor  adoption  effects,  appears  to exert  a very different  influence  on
24  Similar  qualitative  results  obtain  when  the standard  deviation  in M2/GDP  is computed  over  the five
years prior to adoption for countries with explicit schemes, and when a simple standard deviation
from 1980-95  is computed  for countries  that retained implicit  insurance.
20changes in financial depth. 25 Its estimated coefficient is positive and significant  across
many specifications in Table 6.26 The net effect of adopting explicit insurance should,
however, be calculated for a given level of volatility.  In model (3), for example, the net
effect of deposit insurance evaluated at the sample mean for volatility (a coefficient of
variation in M2/GDP equal to  10.26%) is negative; the estimated coefficient is -2.12,
which is significantly  different from zero at the t = 0.07 level. For a volatility level one
standard deviation below the sample mean (a coefficient of variation in M2/GDP equal to
1.53%), the result is reversed -- the estimated coefficient is 2.91 which is significantly
different from zero at the t = 0.05 level.  For those countries that did not adopt explicit
deposit insurance, however, the sample minimum for volatility was 5. 1%. At that
25  In the Table  6 results.  Mexico,  Finland, and Norway  are included  among  the  countries  with explicit
deposit  insurance. In each case,  the government  has explicitlv  declared  that all deposits  in their
banking system  are covered  by insurance. Since thev lack coverage  limits,  they  are somewhat
different  than the other  countries  with explicit  insurance. Indeed,  one might  argue that their systems
have more  in common  with implicit  schemes. The qualitative  results  of this analysis  are, however,
unchanged  when  one or all of these  observations  are excluded.
26  As noted.  another way  to test whether  the institutional  aspects  of deposit  insurance  positively  affect
subsequent  changes in financial  depth is to interact  the explicit  insurance  dummy  variable with  the
ICRG  legal index. This interaction  term should capture  the credibility  of deposit  insurance  from the
depositors'  perspective. Indeed,  when  that interaction  term replaces  the one in Table  6. its estimated
coefficient  is positive  and significant. The coefficient  on the explicit  dummy,  which, in that
specification.  should  capture  non-institutional  aspects  of deposit  insurance,  is negative and
significant. The qualitative  results  are, therefore,  similar  for either  interaction  term -- for countries
with high levels  of prior financial  stability  or strong  legal traditions,  the net effect  of explicit  deposit
insurance  on subsequent  financial  depth appears  to be positive  (See  Appendix  2. Table 8).
Regardless  of the choice  of interaction  term, the explicit  dummy  and per capita income  compete  for
explanatory  power  -- the dummy's  estimated  coefficients  and t-statistics  are largest  (in absolute
value)  when income  is left  out of the regression. It appears  that  aspects  of the deposit  insurance
decision  not related  to banking sector  instability  exert a positive  influence  on subsequent  changes  in
financial  depth,  and that this effect  is closely  tied to income  levels.  Its not clear, however,  that
income  level  should enter  the change  in financial  depth regressions  as an explanatory  variable.
While  there is a positive  relationship  between  changes  in income  and changes in financial  depth,
there is little reason  to expect  income  level to be related  to subsequent  changes  in M2/GDP  and
QMIGDP. The results  in Table  6, therefore,  should  not be interpreted  as implying  that the
institutional  aspects  of adopting  deposit  insurance  have little effect  on subsequent  financial  depth
when one controls  for income. Rather, institutional  aspects  have  a positive  impact  on depth, and
21volatility level, the net effect of explicit insurance is positive, though not statistically
different from zero at conventionally accepted levels.  Similar qualitative results obtain for
all specifications in Table 6.  In short, at low levels of volatility explicit insurance is
positively associated with subsequent financial deepening -- unfortunately, those countries
that have yet to adopt explicit insurance tend to have high financial sector volatility. 27
The pronounced  positive partial  correlation  between financial  volatility and
changes in financial depth in Table 6 requires explanation. Past volatility is, perhaps, one
indication that future volatility will be high (other things equal). While volatility may
indicate something about the magnitude of future changes in financial depth, it should not
necessarily be an indicator of the direction of those changes -- and thus not a very useful
explanatory variable in these regressions. However, inflation, which also enters the
regressions significantly,  is itself a measure of volatility. Inflation's predicted effect on
financial depth, moreover, is clearly negative; thus, the component of volatility not related
to inflation might be better thought of as an institutional measure capturing the activity
level in the financial sector.  Indeed, the residuals from a regression of volatility on
inflation are largest for countries like Switzerland -- those have particularly active financial
there  is a strong  association  between  institutional  development  and income.  Sorting  out the  lines  of
causation  between  income  and institutional  development  is beyond  the  scope  of this  paper.
27  1 also  split  the  sample  into  high-  and  low-volatility  sub-samples  and re-ran  the  regressions  in Table
6. For  high-volatility  countries  the relationship  between  explicit  insurance  and subsequent  changes
in financial  depth  was  positive,  though  insignificant;  for low-volatility  countries,  the  estimated
coefficient  was  negative  and significant.  Coefficients  are  estimated  with  more  error  for  these  small
sub-samples,  but the  qualitative  results  are  supportive  of those  presented  in the  paper. Similar
results  obtain  when  the  sample  is split  according  to ICRG  legal  tradition  scores;  explicit  insurance  is
associated  with  increased  depth  for  high  scorers,  decreased  depth  for  low  scorers,  although  neither  of
those  coefficients  achieves  significance.
22sectors relative to GDP.  After controlling for inflation, it should come as less a surprise,
therefore, that volatility is associated with increased financial depth. 28
It should also be noted that the results are not particularly sensitive to the volatility
measure chosen.  Neither the standard deviation in M2/GDP nor its coefficient of variation
is a perfect measure of volatility.  Standard deviation probably overstates volatility for
countries with particularly well-established banking sectors.  In Switzerland, for example,
where M2/GDP is over 100%, a 5% swing in M2/GDP is quite common.  In developing
countries with M2/GDP near 10-20%, a 5% swing is not all that common.  Yet
Switzerland, whose banking sector is relatively stable, would appear to be more volatile
than many developing countries based only on their standard deviation. While the
coefficient of variation (standard deviation/mean) corrects for the "Switzerland problem",
it introduces others.  For countries with similar standard deviations, the measure captures
cross-sectional variation in the level of M2/GDP.  Thus, for developed countries, whose
standard deviations tend not to exceed 1-2% per year, those with high M2/GDP levels
appear to be more stable than the others.  Fortunately, although each measure has its
28  For countries  that adopted  explicit  deposit  insurance,  however,  the regression  results  do imply  that
the net effect  of volatility  on subsequent  changes  in financial  depth is negative  and significant  at the
t=0.  10  level. The estimated  coefficient  is simply  the sum of the volatility  coefficient  and the
coefficient  for the interaction  term (-.219).
Perhaps  a more  complete  indication  of the possible  effects  of deposit  insurance  and volatility  on
subsequent  financial  depth can be obtained  from the sample  means  for the independent  variables
(Table  2). For countries  that did not adopt  explicit  insurance,  the average  coefficient  of variation  in
M2/GDP  was 15.3%,  average  inflation  was 19%,  and the average  real growth  rate  was a bit less  than
1%. Evaluated  at those levels  of the independent  variables,  the model  implies  a 2.8% reduction  in
M2/GDP  after adopting  explicit  insurance. That estimated  reduction  is significantly  different  from
zero  at the  t=0.07  level. By  contrast,  evaluated  at those  levels  of  the  explanatory  variables,  the  model
implies  a 2.3% increase  for a country  that retained  implicit  insurance  (also significantly  different
from zero).
23limitations -- standard deviation weighing changes in M2/GDP too heavily, the coefficient
of variation weighing M2/GDP levels too heavily -- the qualitative results of the
regression analysis are insensitive to the measure selected.
The regression analysis  in Table 6 has a number of policy implications. One way to
interpret the results is to apportion the decision to adopt explicit deposit insurance across
the decision components. Thus, if a government's desire to adopt explicit deposit
insurance is due to present financial instability, one might expect that decision to meet
with a reduction in financial depth (other things equal). Decreased financial depth,
moreover, will likely be associated with lower real growth.  In those cases where
governments adopted explicit insurance when the standard deviation of M2/GDP was
greater than 2%, subsequent economic growth was, on average, .3% lower than it had
been in the three years prior (Table 7).
Table 7: Real Growth  Rates  for Countries  that Adopted  Explicit  Deposit Insurance
Volatility  in Three  Real Growth  Rate in  Real Growth  Rate in  Observations
Years  Prior to Adoption  Three  Years  Prior to  Three  Years After  the
of Explicit  Insurance  Adoption  of Explicit  Adoption  of Explicit
Insurance  Insurance
Stan  Dev M2/GDP  >2%  0.4%  0.1%  10
Stan Dev M2/GDP  <2%  2.2%  3.2%  14
Notes: Growth  rates from Summers-Heston.
By contrast, if  volatility is low, and the motivation for adopting explicit insurance
stems from a past crisis or is part of a general improvement in legal institutions, one might
expect increased financial depth accompanied by a higher real growth rate.  Indeed, in
those cases where governments adopted explicit insurance when the standard deviation in
M2/GDP was less than 2%, subsequent economic growth was 1% higher than it had been
in the prior three years.  What may be most important, moreover, is not the government's
24true motivation for adopting explicit insurance, but rather the plublic  perception of that
motivation.  At the least, the regressions suggest that the expected effect should not be
negative in countries with stable financial sectors and sound legal traditions.
V. Conclusions
Simple bi-variate correlations between explicit insurance and financial depth are
positive. However, when one also controls for income and inflation, that relationship
disappears -- in fact, the partial correlation between changes in subsequent financial depth
and the adoption of explicit insurance is negative (and quite pronounced).  Counter-
intuitive though it may be, that stylized fact may be partially explained by the political and
economic factors that motivated the decision to establish an explicit scheme. To date,
governments have been most likely to adopt explicit insurance in instances where their
financial sectors were tranquil and their neighbors were also doing so.  To a lesser extent,
they adopted explicit schemes in countries where legal institutions were strong, or in the
aftermath of a systemictanking  crisis. These circumstances surrounding deposit insurance
decisions, moreover, are associated with different movements in subsequent financial
depth.  Adopting explicit insurance to counteract instability  in the financial sector does not
appear to solve the problem -- the typical reaction to that type of decision has been
negative, at least with regard to financial depth in the three years after the program's
inception. Given their short time horizons and the effect that financial development may
have for economic growth, policy makers may be interested in these results.  As in other
cases, when and why they adopt a policy may be as important as the policy itself
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29Appendix  H.  Credibility  of Deposit  Insurance  Schemes:  ICRG/Explicit  Insurance
Interaction  Results
Table 8:  Change in Financial Depth Regressions,  Interact Explicit Insurance with Legal Traditions
Explan.  Dependent  Variable: Change in M2 as a  Dependent Variable: Change in Quasi-
Variable  % of GDP  Monev as a % of GDP
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Constant  .333  2.64  .353  2.88
(0.25)  (3.24)  (0.28)  (3.70)
Avg. Inflat.  -.093  -.075  -.080  -.060
(4.85)  (4.13)  (4.48)  (3.49)
% Growth  .174  .199  .095  .122
(Real GDP)  (1.16)  (1.26)  (0.68)  (0.81)
Explicit  -3.02  -3.94  -1.81  -2.81
(1.85)  (2.38)  (1.19)  (1.78)
Exp x Law  .688  .496  .681  .470
(2.08)  (1.48)  (2.21)  ,(1.48)
Volatility  .211  .230
(2.16)  (2.53)
Adj. R-Sqre  .474  .419  .402  .310
Obs  40  40  40  40
F  8.03  8.03  6.24  5.38
Prob > F  0.0000  0.0001  0.0003  0.0017
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